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China’s expansion in maritime East Asia has relied heavily on non-naval elements of sea power, 
above all white-hulled constabulary forces. This reflects a strategic decision. Coast guard vessels 
operating on the basis of routine administration and backed up by a powerful military can achieve 
many of China’s objectives without risking an armed clash, sullying China’s reputation, or 
provoking military intervention from outside powers.  
Among China’s many maritime agencies, two organizations particularly fit this bill: China Marine 
Surveillance (CMS) and China Fisheries Law Enforcement (FLE). With fleets comprising 
unarmed or lightly armed cutters crewed by civilian administrators, CMS and FLE could 
vigorously pursue China’s maritime claims while largely avoiding the costs and dangers 
associated with classic “gunboat diplomacy.”  
This same logic argued against employing the armed elements of its maritime law enforcement 
forces, the China Maritime Police (CMP). Though the CMP had the authority and ability to 
operate throughout the three million square kilometers of China’s claimed jurisdictional space, 
Chinese leaders elected to keep this service away from disputed and sensitive areas. Its identity as 
a military organization contradicted key premises of China’s maritime dispute strategy.  
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Since 2013, these assumptions have changed. In that year, Chinese leaders began a major 
restructuring of the country’s fragmented and dysfunctional maritime law enforcement system, 
derisively described as “five dragons managing the sea” (五龙制海). This reform sought to 
“integrate” four Chinese maritime law enforcement forces—the three “dragons” mentioned above, 
plus a fourth force owned by the General Administration of Customs (GAC)—into a new agency 
called the “China Coast Guard.” While organizational change has been slow, one outcome is clear: 
the reform has empowered the armed elements of China’s constabulary forces to play an 
increasingly important role along China’s maritime frontier.1 This reflects a subtle but significant 
shift in Chinese policy, with possible implications both for future PRC behavior and the future of 
the China Coast Guard as an organization. 
The Age of the Toothless “Dragons”  
One of the primary drivers behind Beijing’s development and use of sea power is its perceived 
need to defend and advance the country’s position in its many maritime disputes. These disputes 
involve Chinese claims to sovereignty over offshore islands and claims to certain, often ill-defined, 
“rights” to use and administer the ocean. China’s preferred approach to handling its disputes relies 
heavily on maritime law enforcement forces, backed up by other elements of national power, to 
perform missions that in another age and other circumstances would be the sole province of its 
navy.  
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China’s Maritime Frontier 
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China’s use of maritime law enforcement forces in sovereignty—or, in the Chinese parlance, 
“rights protection”—operations can be traced to the 1980s. Chinese agencies ensured that foreign 
companies operating in Chinese waters, often with Chinese partners, adhered to Chinese 
environmental protection law. Later, Chinese maritime agencies assumed responsibility for 
tracking and monitoring foreign military vessels. Both occurred mostly in undisputed areas.2  
The 1990s saw Chinese coast guard forces directly contribute to China’s campaign to expand the 
geographic frontiers of its control and influence. In late 1994, FLE led the effort to quietly occupy 
Mischief Reef. In 2000, it established a blue-water patrol system, intended in part to manifest and 
enforce Chinese claims in disputed areas in the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and South China Sea 
(including in the Spratlys). However, it was not until the 2006-2008 period that Chinese maritime 
law enforcement forces began maintaining a frequent and regular presence in all of the waters 
China claimed. This effort was led by CMS.3 The vast major of the hostile encounters that took 
place in disputed areas from 2006-2012 involved either CMS or FLE forces, both of which 
comprised civilian forces operating unarmed or lightly-armed vessels.4 
This was by design. On paper, other agencies had both the mandate and the ability to operate in all 
Chinese-claimed waters. Chinese leaders, however, did not permit them to do so. Another major 
civilian agency, the Maritime Safety Administration (MSA), sometimes sailed to trouble spots, 
but its chief political function was to serve as a conduit for international cooperation, or coast 
guard diplomacy.  
The other important blue-water capable law enforcement agency was the CMP.5 Notwithstanding 
its English name, CMP was actually a component of China’s “armed forces” (武装力量). It had a 
clear legal mandate to maintain public security in all Chinese-claimed areas, including those in 
dispute.6 Given that Chinese civilian mariners, especially fishermen, faced danger to life and 
property while operating in the Spratly Islands, there was an obvious need for CMP forces to be 
there.7 While its oceangoing fleet was much smaller than those of CMS and FLE, by early 2007 it 
had some large cutters.8 Logic suggests that CMP would seek to be on the front line fighting for 
the favor of Party leaders and the glory of the Chinese nation, and there is evidence that it did.9  
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Organization, Force Structure, and Missions of the CMP 
The CMP did not exist as an independent agency. It was the amphibious component of China’s 
Border Defense Force (公安边防部队), itself a part of the People’s Armed Police (PAP). Each 
coastal province or provincial-level city had a Border Defense Force Contingent (总队), beneath 
which existed at least one CMP “detachment” (支队) and a number of “groups” (大队). CMP 
forces operated on the basis of local and national law, but took orders in a vertical chain of 
command (垂直管理) that led to the Ministry of Public Security. By the eve of the China Coast 
Guard reform, CMP comprised some two dozen detachments and numbered well over 10,000 
soldiers.10 
The CMP was China’s sole “active duty” (现役) maritime law enforcement force. Its ranks 
comprised “officers and enlisted” (官兵) who donned military uniforms similar to those worn by 
members of the PLA. Prospective soldiers entered through three primary channels: the PAP 
service academies, including the China Maritime Police Academy in Ningbo; direct commission 
for qualified graduates from civilian universities; and enlistment (义务兵).11 New recruits 
received basic training like those joining other components of the PAP. 
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Public security and anti-smuggling constituted the CMP’s core missions. Unlike CMS and FLE 
personnel, CMP officers had police powers.12 They could investigate, detain, arrest, and charge 
suspected violators of the Chinese criminal code.13 
By the eve of the China Coast Guard reform, the CMP came to own hundreds of vessels, most 
armed. Among those capable of blue-water operations, it possessed over twenty 600-tonne Type 
618B cutters, each equipped with 30 mm cannons. The CMP also owned two former Type 053H 
frigates, transferred from the PLA Navy in December 2006.14 In early 2007, a Shanghai 
detachment commissioned a 1,500 tonne cutter (1001), easily the most capable vessel in the fleet. 
Whereas CMS and FLE vessels were considered civilian “ships” (船), CMP cutters were 
designated “warships” (舰), implying they were built to higher (i.e., military) standards.15  
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Because of restrictions imposed on them by China’s civilian leadership, CMP cutters seldom 
ventured far from the Chinese mainland. They did not sail to disputed land features, except the 
Paracels, which China had controlled since 1974. Even then, they did so only rarely. As such, they 
operated far from the frontlines of China’s sovereignty campaign. One exception is worth 
highlighting. 
In the summer of 2006, vessels owned by China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) 
conducted seismic surveys south of the Paracels, in waters also claimed by Vietnam. The CCP 
Central Committee approved a plan to use CMP forces to protect these operations from possible 
Vietnamese obstruction. To this end, the CMP mobilized units from Guangdong, Guangxi, Hainan, 
and Fujian to perform this “escort” mission, unimaginatively code-named “Operation South China 
Sea” (南海行动). The combined forces totaled twelve CMP cutters and 560 soldiers. Because the 
service then owned no vessels displacing more than 400 tonnes, the CMP also leased eight large 
civilian vessels for the mission. From 1 June-31 July 2006, CMP forces fended off waves of 
Vietnamese “armed vessels” (武装船) sent to obstruct the survey. The CNPC team ultimately 
completed its operations without suffering damage or loss of life.16 
This ostensibly successful escort mission marked both the beginning and end of major CMP 
sovereignty operations.17 In June 2007, CNPC went back to these waters for another round of 
seismic surveys, but this time its ships were escorted by much larger yet unarmed cutters owned 
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by China Marine Surveillance. This operation was also fiercely contested by Vietnam.18 
Subsequent oil/gas escort exploration in these waters was likewise protected by CMS cutters.19 
CMP was out of the rights protection game.  
Coast Guard Reform 
The fragmentation of China’s maritime law enforcement system impeded effective administration 
of Chinese waters and prevented synergies in the struggle to defend and advance China’s 
maritime claims. Different agencies seldom shared information. They did not coordinate their 
activities. Their investments were redundant. They competed with each other for influence, 
resources, and prestige.20  
Chinese leaders long recognized the need for reform. Discussions had been underway for years. In 
2005, then Premier Wen Jiabao attempted to integrate agencies operating in the Gulf of Tonkin. 
This failed.21 In early 2013 a new generation of CCP politburo members led by Xi Jinping 
decided to impose top-down reform. Xi himself headed the Maritime Rights and Interests Leading 
Small Group, set up in 2012 with the purpose of formulating and coordinating China’s maritime 
dispute strategy.22 He would have been acutely aware of the problems caused by China’s 
“balkanized” maritime law enforcement system.23 Additionally, he was committed to a more 
assertive approach to pursuing China’s maritime claims. To realize Xi’s aims, bureaucratic walls 
would have to come down. 
The plan to reform Chinese maritime law enforcement was announced early in Xi’s tenure, at the 
2013 National People’s Congress. The legislation that launched the reform called for “integrating” 
(整合) four maritime law enforcement forces under the authority of the State Oceanic 
Administration (SOA).24 The new agency would be called the “China Coast Guard.” Reform 
legislation notably did not call for “unifying” (统一) or “merging” (合并) the different agencies. 
This implied that the reform would occur in two or more phases and that the purpose of phase one 
was to knit together several key “dragons” and establish unified decision-making under a single 
chain of command. True organizational “unification” would apparently come later.  
Reform would be difficult. It required the old agencies—and, perhaps more importantly, the 
departments in which they resided—to relinquish resources and authorities to SOA, a low-ranking 
agency. SOA, for its part, would have to work closely with the Ministry of Public Security, which 
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was charged with providing (undefined) “operational guidance” (业务指导) to the new service. 
Negotiated compromises led to bizarre results: for example, the Director of the China Coast 
Guard had an administrative rank senior to the Director of SOA, the organization which oversaw 
his agency.25 At the operational level, effective action at sea would require four completely 
different forces—with different authorities, structures, identities, doctrine, cultures, and personnel 
and training systems—to work together. Achieving interoperability would take time.  
Four years later, the China Coast Guard reform remains in phase one. It is still not a single, 
homogenous organization.26 All four antecedents still exist in some form. Some organizational 
“integration” has occurred, but the pace of reform is clearly slower than planned.27 With the 
creation of a headquarters in Beijing charged with overall command of all China Coast Guard 
units, coordination has improved. However, members of the different agencies still identify with 
their old services, and seldom mix. 




In the case of the CMP, most of the service’s pre-reform detachments still exist. However, instead 
of being subordinate to Border Defense Force contingents, they now operate under China Coast 
Guard contingents, one in each coastal province or provincial-level city. CMP vessels are painted 
with China Coast Guard colors and 5-digit hull numbers, distinguishing them from CMS and FLE 
ships (which have 4-digit hull numbers).28 Many CMP personnel now wear all-black working 
uniforms, though some continue to use older green camouflage uniforms. Officers and enlisted 
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still wear olive green PAP service uniforms. In the Chinese literature, elements of the CMP are 
called the “active duty China Coast Guard Forces” (中国海警现役部队), distinguishing them 
from the civilian elements (CMS, FLE, and GAC).29 There is very little evidence of joint training 
with other components of the China Coast Guard. As will be discussed below, they have 
conducted major operations together, with disappointing results. Table 1 lists current CMP 
detachments. 






























































Moving to the Front Line 
Chinese constabulary forces perform two major types of sovereignty missions. First, they 
maintain administrative presence in disputed areas. This is a political operation intended to serve 
various purposes, above all persuading foreigners of the seriousness and credibility of China’s 
claims. The second role is far more coercive in nature. Chinese leaders direct law enforcement 
forces to impose Chinese prerogatives on foreign vessels operating in Chinese-claimed areas. This 
mission may be driven by political aims, but it serves the fundamental purpose of controlling 
space. When performing such “enforcement” missions, Chinese forces are authorized to adopt 
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measures short of armed force: bumping, ramming, jamming communications, and firing water 
cannons. 
Since coast guard reform began, CMP forces have increased their involvement in both types of 
missions. They are now present in waters that they seldom, if ever, sailed to in the years prior to 
the reform. They have also been involved in major operations to forcibly assert Chinese claims, 
operations formerly only performed by CMS and FLE. CMP soldiers operating CMP vessels have 
expanded their sovereignty operations both in the East China Sea and in the South China Sea. 
Moreover, teams of CMP personnel are now often embarked on CMS and FLE ships, militarizing 
operations that were once entirely civilian in nature. In recent years, Chinese leaders have 
hastened the arming of the maritime frontier by greatly increasing the size of the CMP’s blue-
water patrol fleet.  
The CMP in the East China Sea 
At the core of China’s sovereignty campaign in the East China Sea are actions to undermine 
Japan’s administration of the Senkaku Islands (which the Chinese call the Diaoyu Islands). From 
December 2008 to September 2012, this approach involved periodic constabulary patrols to 
waters adjacent to the islands, sometimes within the 12 nautical mile territorial sea. In September 
2012, Chinese law enforcement vessels began maintaining a near-continuous presence around the 
features with frequent intrusions into the territorial sea. For years, Chinese leaders assigned these 
presence missions exclusively to CMS and FLE. 
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This changed in late 2015. On 26 December, for the first time a China Coast Guard ship formation 
entering the Senkakus territorial sea included a CMP cutter—CCG 31239, one of three former 
PLA Navy frigates transferred to a Shanghai detachment in mid-2015. In the transfer processes, 
the 2,000 tonne ship had been stripped of its missiles and main gun, but retained four 37 mm 
cannons. Even in its reduced state, CCG 31239 was clearly of a different class than its consorts.31  
Since then, CMP vessels have completed dozens of missions to the Senkakus, always together 
with CMS and FLE cutters. All three PLA Navy frigates transferred to a Shanghai-based unit of 
the CMP have sailed to the Senkakus. A fourth Shanghai-based cutter, 31101 (former 1001), has 
also sailed there (11 September 2016 and 8 October 2016).32 A ship from a Zhejiang detachment 
(33115) and a ship from a Fujian detachment (35115) have completed Senkaku patrols, doing so 
for the first time on 7 August 2016 and 6 November 2016, respectively.33  
CMP cutters have been involved in at least one major operation to enforce China’s “rights” to 
exploit fisheries resources in disputed waters in the East China Sea. Over several days in August 
2016, Chinese authorities allowed well over 200 Chinese fishing trawlers to operate in waters near 
the Senkaku Islands, with some straying into the territorial sea. These boats were escorted by 
some twenty Chinese maritime law enforcement vessels, including nine CMP cutters. Table 2 
lists the vessels involved: unit, hull number, and other details.34 
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Table 2. CMP Vessels Involved in August 2016 Escort Operation to the Senkakus 
Location of 
Detachment 
Hull # Notes 
Zhejiang 33115 1,700 tonnes. Originally procured by FLE; late transferred to the CMP. 
Armed with a 30 mm cannon. 
33102 600 tonnes. Type 618B cutter. Armed with a 30 mm cannons. 
33103 1,600 tonnes. Resembles a 056 frigate. Originally procured by the GAC; 
later transferred to the CMP. Armed with 30mm cannon.  
Fujian 35115 1,700 tonnes. Originally procured by FLE; later transferred to the CMP. 
Armed with a 30 mm cannon. 
35102 600 tonnes. Type 618B cutter. Apparently not armed. 
35104 600 tonnes. Originally procured by the GAC; later transferred to the 
CMP. Armed with a 30 mm cannon. 
Shanghai 31101 1,500 tonnes. Commissioned by the CMP in 2007. Armed with a 30 mm 
cannon. 
31239 Former PLA Navy frigate. Armed with four 37 mm cannons. 
Guangdong 44103 600 tonnes. Type 618B cutter. Armed with 30 mm cannons.  
 
Also in the East China Sea, the China Coast Guard is charged with ensuring security around 
Chinese facilities at the Chunxiao/Shirakaba gas field. While China’s rigs are located west of the 
midline between Japan and China, they tap resources that may straddle the Japanese-claimed 
boundary. Japan is therefore hostile to their operations. In 2004, CMS and other civilian forces 
began patrolling these sensitive waters to deter possible Japanese harassment. In recent years, the 
CMP has also conducted this mission.35 
The cases cited above just involve known CMP vessels operated by CMP crews. But CMP 
personnel are now also embarking on CMS and FLE vessels heading to disputed waters. For 
example, on twelve instances from mid-2013 to mid-2015 the 3rd detachment of the Fujian 
contingent sent SWAT personnel (特勤队员) aboard CMS and FLE vessels sailing to the 
Senkakus.36 This suggests that any China Coast Guard vessel could have armed crew members 
with the authority to detain, arrest, and charge foreigners under the Chinese criminal code.37 
The CMP in the South China Sea 
In the four years since the China Coast Guard reform began, the CMP has expanded both presence 
and enforcement operations in the South China Sea. Prior to 2013, CMP cutters only operated in 
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the Paracels. Now they sail to all Chinese-claimed waters. With responsibility for the two million 
square kilometers within the “nine-dashed line,” the Hainan contingent has led the way. The 2nd 
detachment began deploying ships to the Spratlys sometime in 2015.38 In early January 2017, 
CCG 46115 of the 2nd detachment sailed to the Spratlys for a several-week patrol.39 The 3rd 
detachment is also active in the Spratly Archipelago. The 3,000 tonne CCG 46305 had conducted 
its first cruise of these remote claims by February 2016.40 It now appears to operate there on a 
routine basis.41  




Vessels from other CMP contingents, including those based in northern provinces, have also 
operated in the South China Sea. For instance, in March 2017 the 1,500 tonne cutter 33115 from 
the Zhejiang contingent—the same ship that escorted hundreds of Chinese fishing vessels to the 
Senkakus in August 2016—steamed south along the western border of the nine-dashed line, 
ultimately switching off its AIS transceiver when it reached waters east of Quang Ngai, 
Vietnam.42 The 1,500 tonne cutter 37115, based in faraway Shandong, has also done sovereignty 
patrols in the South China Sea.43  
As in the East China Sea, Chinese constabulary forces operating in the South China Sea are 
charged with enforcing the country’s claims through threats and coercive measures short of armed 
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force. These operations range from obstructing foreign surveying vessels to protecting Chinese 
fishermen from foreign harassment. In recent years, the CMP has played a growing role in such 
operations. 
The prime example is the defense of HYSY 981, a Chinese drilling rig harangued in waters just 
south of the Paracels in mid-2014. This event is important, not just as a milestone in the CMP’s 
rise to prominence in China’s maritime sovereignty campaign. As will be discussed below, it may 
also have convinced Chinese leaders of the need to militarize the maritime frontier.  
In early May 2014, China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) deployed a very large 
drilling rig, HYSY 981, to disputed waters southwest of Triton Island in the Paracels.44 Vietnam 
responded with vigor, sending a number of coast guard and militia vessels to obstruct its 
operations. Then less than a year old, the China Coast Guard was called upon to protect the rig, by 
physically blocking access to the waters surrounding it.45 
Over the course of the 88-day operation, the China Coast Guard deployed CMP vessels from 
many different detachments. Aside from the South China Sea provinces (Guangxi, Guangdong, 
Hainan, and Fujian), ships came from as far away as Zhejiang, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Shandong, and 
Hebei. Working in conjunction with other elements of the China Coast Guard, CMP vessels 
engaged, chased and shouldered Vietnamese vessels, firing water cannons at sensitive hardware 
and down smoke stacks.46  
The CMP has also been asked to buttress China’s control over Scarborough Shoal, seized in 2012 
by CMS and FLE working in concert with China’s maritime militia. Since April 2012, Chinese 
maritime law enforcement forces have maintained constant presence near this feature, located just 
100 nm northwest of Subic Bay. Until the recent thawing of relations with the Philippines, 
Chinese forces were ordered to bar Philippine fishermen from approaching Scarborough Shoal. 
Prior to the China Coast Guard reform, only CMS and FLE ships served this guard duty. However, 
since 2014, a number of CMP units have rotated through. By the end of 2016, from example, 
vessels from Guangxi detachments had conducted 21 rights protection missions to the Paracels 
and Scarborough Shoal.47 The Guangdong-based CCG 44101 has also patrolled the feature.48 
Acquiring a Blue-Water Fleet  
Since late 2006, when the CMP received two former PLA Navy frigates, the CMP has had some 
capacity to operate in remote locations along China’s maritime frontier.49 However, the service 
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has never had the large numbers of blue-water cutters owned by civilian agencies such as FLE and 
CMS. Since 2014, Chinese leaders have taken steps to boost material capabilities needed to 
dramatically expand the service’s role in China’s sovereignty campaign.   
First, ships originally procured by other services have been redirected to CMP units. FLE and the 
GAC have been the big losers in this reshuffling of resources. For instance, CCG 46305, a key 
rights protection cutter owned by a Hainan detachment of the CMP, was originally procured by 
FLE. In addition, a number of 1,500 tonne cutters built for FLE and GAC units were ultimately 
delivered to CMP detachments. See Table 3 for representative examples.  




Second, in July 2015, the PLA Navy transferred three Type 053 frigates to the CMP. These 
vessels were stripped of their main guns, re-painted with China Coast Guard colors and pennant 
numbers, and delivered to the service’s Shanghai detachment.  
Lastly, the CMP has embarked on a major shipbuilding campaign of its own. In May 2016, 
Chinese shipyards launched two new ship classes, which have since entered serial production. The 
first was the 2,700 tonne Type 718 class, the first units of which have already been delivered to 
Hainan detachments of the CMP. The second ship class, Type 818, displaces over 4,000 tonnes 
and resembles a Type 054A frigate. The first two units of this class (46301 and 46302) were 
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delivered to Hainan detachments in early 2017. Both new ship classes are equipped with 76 mm 
cannons.  
Table 3. Large Cutters Delivered to CMP Units Since 2014 
# Based Hull #  Displacement Notes 
1 Liaoning 21115 1,500t Originally procured by FLE.  
2 Shandong 37115 1,500t Originally procured by FLE. 
3 Shanghai 31239 2,000t Former PLA Navy frigate.  
4 Shanghai 31240 2,000t Former PLA Navy frigate. 
5 Shanghai 31241 2,000t Former PLA Navy frigate. 
6 Zhejiang 33103 1,500t Originally procured by GAC. 
7 Zhejiang 33115 1,500t Originally procured by FLE. 
8 Fujian 35115 1,500t Originally procured by FLE. 
9 Guangdong 44104 1,500t Originally procured by GAC. 
10 Hainan 46104 1,500t Originally procured by GAC. 
11 Hainan 46111 2,700t Type 718 cutter. Delivered in late 
2016. 
12 Hainan 46112 2,700t Type 718 cutter. Delivered in late 
2016. 
13 Hainan 46301 4,000t Type 818 cutter. Delivered in early 
2017. 
14 Hainan 46302 4,000t Type 818 cutter. Delivered in early 
2017. 
15 Hainan 46305 3,000t Originally procured by FLE. 
16 Guangxi 45111 2,700t Type 718 cutter. Delivered in early 
2017. 
 
At the same time that new armed cutters have been delivered to CMP detachments, unarmed CMS 
ships have been transferred from the China Coast Guard to other agencies, especially oceanic 
research institutes within the State Oceanic Administration. Many of these had been rights 
protection stalwarts. For instance, CMS 49 has participated in many sovereignty patrols to the 
Senkakus. CMS 84 was one of two cutters that confronted the Philippine navy at Scarborough 
Shoal in April 2012, precipitating the 10-week standoff. Both are now listed as components of the 
SOA research fleet. The large-scale repurposing of CMS vessels has changed the overall 
composition of China’s “rights protection” fleet in favor of armed vessels. Table 4 lists vessels 
transferred from the China Coast Guard to the SOA research fleet. 
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Table 4. CMS Ships Transferred to the SOA Research Fleet50 
# Hull #  Displacement Notes 
1 169 4,600t Former PLA Navy AGI. Commissioned in 1982. Transferred to the CMS 
South China Sea Fleet in late 2012. Belongs to the CMS 8
th
 detachment.  
2 168 3,400t Former PLA Navy tug. Commissioned in 1982. Transferred to CMS in late 
2012. Belongs to the CMS 8
th
 detachment.  
3 84 1740t Commissioned in 2011. One of two CMS vessels involved in the 
Scarborough Shoal incident in April 2012. Belongs to the South China Sea 
Branch of SOA.  
4 111 4400t Former PLA Navy AGI. Commissioned in 1982. Has patrolled the Senkakus. 
Belongs to the Northern Branch of SOA. 
5 72 900t Commissioned in 1989. Belongs to the South China Sea Branch of SOA. 
Defended PRC surveying activities from Vietnamese attack in June 2007. 
6 47 800t Belongs to the East China Sea Branch of SOA. Commissioned in 1973. 
Involved in the harassment of Hakuryu-5 in the East China Sea in May 1985. 
7 49 1100t Belongs to the Eastern Branch of SOA. Commissioned in 1996. Has sailed to 
the Senkakus. Involved in harassment of Japanese surveying vessels in East 
China Sea in February 2012. 
8 53 1330t Commissioned in 1976. Belongs to the East China Sea Branch of SOA. 
9 62 800t Commissioned in 1973. Belongs to the East China Sea Branch of SOA. 
Involved in the 2002 monitoring of Japanese operations to salvage a North 
Korean spy vessel sunk in the East China Sea in late 2001. 
10 50 3,500t Now called Xiang Yang Hong 19. Belongs to the East China Sea Branch of 
SOA.  
11 83 3,500t Now called Haice 3301. Belongs to the South China Sea Branch of SOA.  
The Future of the China Coast Guard 
Since maritime law enforcement reform began in mid-2013, China has sought to integrate four 
separate forces under one chain of command. Ultimately, however, Chinese leaders seek to create 
a single homogenous organization capable of performing all of the mission sets of the four 
original forces, only more effectively and more efficiently. The question naturally becomes, what 
model will China adopt for the future China Coast Guard? Will it be a civilian agency like CMS 
or FLE, or a military organization like the CMP? In March 2013, SOA officials promised an 
answer would soon be forthcoming, but did not ultimately offer one, and have not in the years 
since.51 The story of the rise of the CMP offers clues about the future of the new agency. Indeed, 
known facts about China Coast Guard recruitment programs suggest that it is evolving into a 
military organization based on the CMP model.  
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Prior to mid-2013, each of the four “dragons” had its own recruitment and training system. CMS, 
for example, primarily selected new law enforcement personnel through competitive civil service 
examination. Upon selection, they received their initial training at the PLA Navy Non-
Commissioned Officer Academy in Bengbu, Anhui. FLE likewise recruited from graduating 
college students, choosing candidates with desired backgrounds by means of civil service 
examination. New law enforcement personnel received initial training at FLE training centers and 
specialized training through programs run by civilian institutions, such as Shanghai Ocean 
University. Since 2014, CMS and FLE have apparently closed these recruitment and training 
channels.52 
Now, the only path to become an officer in the China Coast Guard is through a program leading to 
a commission in the People’s Armed Police. Established at the end of 2014, this program recruits 
new officers from among the crop of graduating college students.53 To date, this program has 
commissioned more than 1,000 officers (警官). In January 2017, the China Coast Guard began its 
third round of officer recruitment. 




Applicants apply through a centralized recruitment program run by the China Coast Guard 
Political Department (中国海警局政治部). They must select one of several possible China Coast 
Guard units: the three regional bureaus and the eleven contingents. Each has its own specific 
recruitment targets (numbers, skills, genders). In the 2017 recruitment effort, for example, the 
Hainan contingent plans to recruit 65 graduating students to join units under its command. It seeks 
recruits with a broad range of backgrounds, but especially prizes those with degrees in marine 
engineering, medicine, and the foreign languages that its forces are most likely to use while 
operating along the maritime frontier (Vietnamese and Tagalog).54  
                                                          
***
 China Coast Guard Recruitment Website, Accessed 23 March 2017 
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Successful recruits receive commissions in the PAP, with rank/grade determined based on 
educational background (see Table 5). 
Table 5. Grades and Ranks for New China Coast Guard Officers 
Educational Background Grade Rank 
Technical School Degree (大专) Platoon Leader (正排职) Ensign (武警少尉) 
Bachelor’s Degree (本科) Company Deputy Leader (副连职) Lieutenant JG (武警中尉) 
Master’s Degree (硕士研究生) Company Leader (正连职) Lieutenant (武警上尉) 
 
Officer candidates receive training at the China Coast Guard Training Center in Guangdong 
province (广东海警训练基地). In January 2017, the second class of officer candidates completed 
six months of basic training (入警培训). More than 300 freshly-minted officers were then sent to 
their front-line units. They will complete at least three more months of “on-the-job training” (岗
位任职培训), followed by a final three-month “exercise period” (当兵锻炼时间) during which 
they will make final preparations to become fully competent front-line soldiers. The next stop for 
most new officers is the maritime frontier, or, as one source put it, “key rights protection 
battlefields” (维权执法主战场).55  
That the China Coast Guard’s sole officer recruitment program leads to a commission in the PAP 
clearly indicates that the service is becoming a military organization based on the CMP model. 
The content of official recruitment materials confirms this conclusion. According to a recruitment 
announcement for the South China Sea Branch of the China Coast Guard, the agency is a “law 
enforcement force (队伍) that is militarizing (按军事化方向建设) and has the attributes of a 
police force (具有警察属性).” Even more revealing, applicants are forbidden from 
“simultaneously applying to other public security military organizations (such as the Border 
Defense Force, Firefighting Force, or Personal Security Force),” all of which are components of 
the PAP (警种).56  
Why the CMP? 
The rise of the CMP was never a given. Indeed, Chinese leaders decided to create the China Coast 
Guard before they knew what kind of organization it would become. In subsequent years, Chinese 
policymakers came to believe that militarizing the China Coast Guard would improve its 
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performance in China’s sovereignty campaign. The HYSY 981 conflict appears to have been a 
pivotal moment in this decision.57 
The defense of HYSY 981 posed tremendous challenges for the China Coast Guard. Less than a 
year into the reform, the new service was poorly integrated at the operational level. Ships from 
different agencies were not yet able to work together effectively, with near calamitous results. 
This is suggested by the urgent calls for reinforcements from provincial maritime law 
enforcement agencies and organizations that seldom did sovereignty enforcement ops, such as 
Maritime Safety Administration and the China Rescue Service. Indeed, the PLA Navy was forced 
to take tactical command of the operation.58 Writing in the immediate aftermath of the HYSY 981 
operation, Ding Chaoping, an officer in the command department of a Fujian-based detachment of 
the CMP, lamented, “Since 2013, the coast guard has satisfactorily completed escort missions in 
the South China Sea and East China Sea, but these have revealed a lack of powerful real combat 
capabilities (实战化能力不强) in terms of professionalism (执法素质), individual ship tactics (单
艇战术应用), organization and command of ship formations and joint operations (编队组织指挥
和协同作战), and communications support (通讯保障).”59 
That China ultimately succeeded in defending the rig without using force is largely due to the 
efforts of the CMP. Both CMS and FLE sent the cream of their fleets to defend HYSY 981. 
However, it was ultimately CMP cutters crewed by CMP personnel that served as the “main force” 
(主力) in the defense of the rig.60 The available photos confirm this conclusion.  
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The strong performance of the CMP south of Triton Island appears to have convinced Chinese 
leaders of the value of placing military, not civilian, forces on the front lines. As one China 
Maritime Police Academy professor, Li Lin, put it, events like the defense of HYSY 981 had 
shown that “in a real fight, only soldiers (现役人员) have the needed combat power and executive 
power (执行力) to execute the mission.” Writing in 2016, Li admits that even within the China 
Coast Guard there remained an ongoing debate about the future of the service, “but after more 
than two years of experience, there is consensus on one thing: it must have combat power (战斗
力).” The only force that possessed that attribute was the China Maritime Police. 61 
Choosing paramilitary police forces like the CMP for front-line operations has other advantages. 
It gives China the option to enforce Chinese criminal law against foreign mariners operating in 
Chinese-claimed waters. For example, Hainan public security law lists a number of categories of 
prohibited foreign behavior within Hainan’s “jurisdictional waters” (管辖海域, i.e., all of the 
waters within the “nine-dashed line”) that would warrant a police response.62 These behaviors 
include, inter alia, “illegally” stopping or anchoring, causing an altercation (寻衅滋事), landing 
on a Chinese island, and conducting propaganda activities that infringe Chinese sovereignty or 
threaten Chinese security.63 Foreigners that violate any of these provisions could suffer one of the 
following consequences.64 CMP officers can board, inspect, and expel foreign vessels, and detain 
                                                          
†††
 South China Sea Research Forum, 15 October 2014 
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their crews. The law also allows them to force foreign vessels to halt, change course, or return in 
the direction from whence they came. They would also have legal grounds to impound foreign 
vessels or pursue legal measures in accordance with PRC public security and border law. 
In 2016, China’s Supreme People’s Court issued two regulations providing a “judicial 
interpretation” (司法解释) of the authorities of Chinese maritime law enforcement forces when 
handling foreign infringements.65 The first of two regulations allows for criminal prosecution of 
foreign mariners suspected of poaching anywhere within China’s “jurisdictional waters.”66 
According to the second regulation, repeat foreign intrusions into China’s claimed territorial sea 
would also be subject to criminal prosecution.67 Among front line China Coast Guard forces, only 
CMP officers have the authority to enforce these provisions.68 
CMP partisans had been highlighting these advantages for years, to no avail. 69 For China’s 
civilian leadership, there was a compelling political logic behind the decision to keep the CMP 
close to shore. 70 The CMP comprised soldiers operating ships with deck guns. Sending them to 
sensitive waters risked conjuring images of military coercion. Moreover, in the types of intense 
encounters apt to take place, deploying soldiers introduced a risk of an inadvertent armed clash 
(擦枪走火). Both of these possibilities were anathema to the foreign relations China sought under 
the administration of Hu Jintao.  
These political considerations changed under his successor, Xi Jinping. Building and employing 
capabilities to safeguard China’s maritime claims has received higher priority, and the relative 
importance of stability and restraint has been de-emphasized.71 This shift is vividly highlighted by 
remarks made by Sun Shuxian—then Deputy Director of the China Coast Guard—in an interview 
just a few months prior to the HYSY 981 conflict. Sun openly acknowledged that the future of the 
China Coast Guard was unsettled. However, in his view the new agency should not become a 
component of China’s armed forces. Doing so might “upset” (刺激) China’s neighbors, providing 
fuel for the so-called “China threat theory”—a catch-all term for foreign anxieties about China’s 
rise.72 Sun was a former CMS officer and his lobbying efforts may have been driven in part by 
parochial concerns. Nevertheless, his objections fell on deaf ears.73  
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Begun in mid-2013, the China Coast Guard reform remains very much a work in progress. All 
four forces selected to be “integrated” into the new agency continue to exist in some form. Three 
of the four still perform their old mission sets. However, the reform has dramatically affected the 
fate of the fourth, the China Maritime Police. 
Perhaps due to a decision made in the wake of the HYSY 981 conflict of 2014, Chinese leaders 
have empowered the CMP to play a leading role in China’s sovereignty campaign. Since the CMP 
is a component of China’s armed forces, the result is a marked militarization of China’s maritime 
frontier. Armed cutters crewed by soldiers are operating in areas once only patrolled by civilian 
agencies. When sailing to disputed waters, cutters owned by civilian agencies such as CMS and 
FLE now frequently embark CMP officers.  
This development has at least two potential implications. First, the rise of the CMP could portend 
more vigorous enforcement efforts in disputed areas. Since 2012, the PRC has strengthened the 
legal authorities of Chinese law enforcement forces. To date, the most aggressive of these tools—
i.e., detention and prosecution of foreign civilians operating in Chinese-claimed waters—has not 
yet been used. But with CMP forces now routinely operating on the maritime frontier, these legal 
authorities are available for use when Chinese leaders judge it in the national interest to use them. 
                                                          
‡‡‡
 Website of the State Oceanic Administration, 2 March 2013 
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Within the China Coast Guard, there is already strong impetus to do so: the current practice of 
simply ordering foreign mariners to depart Chinese-claimed areas is an ineffective deterrent 
against future infringements.74  
Second, the growing power and importance of the CMP could have major implications for 
Chinese strategy in the early phases of a crisis or armed conflict.75 The service could play a key 
role in certain scenarios involving the seizure of disputed land features. Indeed, at least one CMP 
detachment has built a training center to prepare for the conduct of island landings (渡海登岛) in 
a “rights protection” scenario.76 Moreover, some of the most recent CMP cutters, especially the 
Type 818 class, are clearly built to military standards and could perhaps be fitted out to serve 
important combat functions in a future conflict.77 
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